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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Procuring Survival*

Matilde Cappelletti, Leonardo M. Giuffrida, Gabriele Rovigatti

The Journal of Industrial Economics · 2024-12 · 72 (4) · 1451-1506

DOI: 10.1111/joie.12395 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 30.05.2024. Verfasst von Matilde Cappelletti und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 12-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 84 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

We investigate the impact of public procurement on business survival. Using Italy as a laboratory, we construct a large‐scale dataset of firms—covering balance‐sheet, income‐statement, and administrative records—and match it with public contract data. Employing a regression discontinuity design for close‐call auctions, we find that winners are more likely to stay in the market than marginal losers after the award and that the boost in survival chances lasts longer than the contract duration. We document that this effect is associated with earnings substitution rather than increased business scale and that survivors experience no productivity premium. Securing contracts relaxes credit constraints and acts as a mechanism for survival.

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APA

Cappelletti, M., Giuffrida, L. M., & Rovigatti, G. (2024). Procuring Survival*. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 72(4), 1451-1506. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12395

Vancouver

Cappelletti M, Giuffrida LM, Rovigatti G. Procuring Survival*. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2024;72(4):1451-1506. doi:10.1111/joie.12395

BibTeX
@article{Cappelletti2024,
  author = {Cappelletti, Matilde and Giuffrida, Leonardo M. and Rovigatti, Gabriele},
  title = {Procuring Survival*},
  journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {72},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1451--1506},
  doi = {10.1111/joie.12395}
}
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