Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures*
The Journal of Industrial Economics · 2023-03 · 71 (1) · 256-290
DOI: 10.1111/joie.12314 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 06.04.2023. Verfasst von Gorkem Celik und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 47 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study information flows in an organization with a top management (principal) and multiple subunits (agents) with private information that determines the organization's overall efficiency. Under centralized communication, eliciting the agents' information may induce the principal to manipulate aggregate information, which obstructs an effective use of information. Under hierarchical communication, the principal concedes more information rent due to loss of control, but is able to use the agents' information more effectively. The trade‐off between the organizational structures depends on the likelihood that the agents are efficient. Centralized communication is optimal when such likelihood is low. Hierarchical communication, by contrast, is optimal when it is high.
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APA
Celik, G., Shin, D., & Strausz, R. (2023). Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures*. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 71(1), 256-290. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12314
Vancouver
Celik G, Shin D, Strausz R. Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures*. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2023;71(1):256-290. doi:10.1111/joie.12314
BibTeX
@article{Celik2023,
author = {Celik, Gorkem and Shin, Dongsoo and Strausz, Roland},
title = {Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures*},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = {2023},
volume = {71},
number = {1},
pages = {256--290},
doi = {10.1111/joie.12314}
}
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