Platform Mergers: Lessons from a Case in the Digital TV Market*
The Journal of Industrial Economics · 2022-09 · 70 (3) · 591-630
DOI: 10.1111/joie.12274 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 26.03.2022. Verfasst von Marc Ivaldi und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 49 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We contribute to the analysis of mergers in two‐sided markets, in which a platform provides its service for free on one side but obtains all its revenues from the other. A structural model allowing for multi‐homing of advertisers is developed to assess a decision of the French competition authority, which approves the merger of the broadcasting services of TV channels but prohibits the merger of their advertising sales services through a behavioral remedy. We show that ignoring the interaction between the two sides of platforms in designing competition or regulatory policy can result in unexpected outcomes.
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APA
Ivaldi, M., & Zhang, J. (2022). Platform Mergers: Lessons from a Case in the Digital TV Market*. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 70(3), 591-630. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12274
Vancouver
Ivaldi M, Zhang J. Platform Mergers: Lessons from a Case in the Digital TV Market*. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2022;70(3):591-630. doi:10.1111/joie.12274
BibTeX
@article{Ivaldi2022,
author = {Ivaldi, Marc and Zhang, Jiekai},
title = {Platform Mergers: Lessons from a Case in the Digital TV Market*},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = {2022},
volume = {70},
number = {3},
pages = {591--630},
doi = {10.1111/joie.12274}
}
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