Warranty, Seller Reputation, and Buyer Experience: Evidence From EBAY Used Car Auctions
The Journal of Industrial Economics · 2019-09 · 67 (3-4) · 593-627
DOI: 10.1111/joie.12213 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 05.02.2020. Verfasst von Xiaogang Che und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Using data from the eBay car auction market, we test several predictions regarding warranties, seller reputation and buyer experience in the determination of the final price. We find that the presence of a warranty generates a price premium, but that its magnitude decreases when the seller has a more established reputation. Compared to private sellers, professional dealers, who are ‘repeated‐game players’ in the market, benefit less from a warranty and its substitutability for seller reputation is relatively small. In addition, a buyer with greater experience tends to pay less for a warranty or for a professional dealership.
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APA
Che, X., Katayama, H., Lee, P., & Shi, N. (2019). Warranty, Seller Reputation, and Buyer Experience: Evidence From EBAY Used Car Auctions. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 67(3-4), 593-627. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12213
Vancouver
Che X, Katayama H, Lee P, Shi N. Warranty, Seller Reputation, and Buyer Experience: Evidence From EBAY Used Car Auctions. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2019;67(3-4):593-627. doi:10.1111/joie.12213
BibTeX
@article{Che2019,
author = {Che, Xiaogang and Katayama, Hajime and Lee, Peter and Shi, Nan},
title = {Warranty, Seller Reputation, and Buyer Experience: Evidence From EBAY Used Car Auctions},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = {2019},
volume = {67},
number = {3-4},
pages = {593--627},
doi = {10.1111/joie.12213}
}
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