Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities
The Journal of Industrial Economics · 2014-12 · 62 (4) · 756-788
DOI: 10.1111/joie.12058 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 22.12.2014. Verfasst von Catherine C. de Fontenay und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 46-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 48 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Australian Research Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper provides an analysis of a non‐cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network. We establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents. That is, we provide a non‐cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non‐cooperative surplus. The resulting division is related to the M yerson‐ S hapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications. We demonstrate this by examining buyer‐seller networks and vertical foreclosure.
Förderung
- Australian Research Council
Zitieren
APA
Fontenay, C. C. D., & Gans, J. S. (2014). Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 62(4), 756-788. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12058
Vancouver
Fontenay CCD, Gans JS. Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2014;62(4):756-788. doi:10.1111/joie.12058
BibTeX
@article{Fontenay2014,
author = {Fontenay, Catherine C. de and Gans, Joshua S.},
title = {Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = {2014},
volume = {62},
number = {4},
pages = {756--788},
doi = {10.1111/joie.12058}
}
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