EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities

Catherine C. de Fontenay, Joshua S. Gans

The Journal of Industrial Economics · 2014-12 · 62 (4) · 756-788

DOI: 10.1111/joie.12058 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 22.12.2014. Verfasst von Catherine C. de Fontenay und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 46-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 48 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Australian Research Council.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper provides an analysis of a non‐cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network. We establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents. That is, we provide a non‐cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non‐cooperative surplus. The resulting division is related to the M yerson‐ S hapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications. We demonstrate this by examining buyer‐seller networks and vertical foreclosure.

Förderung

  • Australian Research Council

Zitieren

APA

Fontenay, C. C. D., & Gans, J. S. (2014). Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 62(4), 756-788. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12058

Vancouver

Fontenay CCD, Gans JS. Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2014;62(4):756-788. doi:10.1111/joie.12058

BibTeX
@article{Fontenay2014,
  author = {Fontenay, Catherine C. de and Gans, Joshua S.},
  title = {Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities},
  journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
  year = {2014},
  volume = {62},
  number = {4},
  pages = {756--788},
  doi = {10.1111/joie.12058}
}
Kostenlos starten →