The Effect of Explicit Communication on pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel
The Journal of Industrial Economics · 2014-06 · 62 (2) · 191-228
DOI: 10.1111/joie.12042 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Industrial Economics, online erschienen am 04.06.2014. Verfasst von Robert Clark und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 68-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 34 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the collapse of collusion in Q uébec's retail gasoline market following a C ompetition B ureau investigation, and show that it involved two empirical regularities: high margins, and asymmetric price adjustments. Using weekly, station‐level prices we test whether collusion was successful, and whether asymmetric adjustments were part of the cartel's strategy. We do so in the markets targeted by the investigation, and in markets throughout the province with similar pre‐collapse pricing (cyclical markets). Our results suggest that stations in both target and cyclical markets adjusted pricing following the announcement: margins fell (by 30%/15% in target/cyclical markets), and adjustments became more symmetric.
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APA
Clark, R., & Houde, J. (2014). The Effect of Explicit Communication on pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 62(2), 191-228. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12042
Vancouver
Clark R, Houde J. The Effect of Explicit Communication on pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2014;62(2):191-228. doi:10.1111/joie.12042
BibTeX
@article{Clark2014,
author = {Clark, Robert and Houde, Jean‐François},
title = {The Effect of Explicit Communication on pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel},
journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics},
year = {2014},
volume = {62},
number = {2},
pages = {191--228},
doi = {10.1111/joie.12042}
}
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