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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Why Have CEO Pay Levels Become Less Diverse?

TORSTEN JOCHEM, GAIZKA ORMAZABAL, ANJANA RAJAMANI

The Journal of Finance · 2026-08 · 81 (4) · 1893-1950

DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70050 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 19.05.2026. Verfasst von TORSTEN JOCHEM und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 63 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper documents a new stylized fact: the cross‐sectional variation in CEO pay levels has declined precipitously in recent years. We offer one explanation for this decline, namely, firms are increasingly benchmarking CEO compensation to industry peers closest in size, thereby creating pay clusters. Our empirical tests provide support for this explanation and suggest that the rise of industry‐size benchmarking is driven by three institutional factors: the mandatory disclosure of compensation peer groups, proxy advisory influence, and say‐on‐pay regulation. Our findings highlight a consequence of adopting a one‐size‐fits‐all standard in the pay‐setting process.

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APA

JOCHEM, T., ORMAZABAL, G., & RAJAMANI, A. (2026). Why Have CEO Pay Levels Become Less Diverse?. The Journal of Finance, 81(4), 1893-1950. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70050

Vancouver

JOCHEM T, ORMAZABAL G, RAJAMANI A. Why Have CEO Pay Levels Become Less Diverse?. The Journal of Finance. 2026;81(4):1893-1950. doi:10.1111/jofi.70050

BibTeX
@article{JOCHEM2026,
  author = {JOCHEM, TORSTEN and ORMAZABAL, GAIZKA and RAJAMANI, ANJANA},
  title = {Why Have CEO Pay Levels Become Less Diverse?},
  journal = {The Journal of Finance},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {81},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1893--1950},
  doi = {10.1111/jofi.70050}
}
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