Leader‐Follower Dynamics in Shareholder Activism
The Journal of Finance · 2026-06 · 81 (3) · 1377-1435
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70033 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 02.04.2026. Verfasst von DORUK CETEMEN und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 70 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We propose a theory of coordination and influence among blockholders. Privately informed activists time their trades in sequence to lower acquisition costs, prompting a strategic use of order flows: leader activists create trading gains for their followers, ultimately influencing their willingness to bear greater value‐enhancing intervention costs. Through this channel, informed trades can exhibit predictability, in sharp contrast with Kyle (1985, Econometrica 53, 1315–1335). We explain how this novel predictability shapes free‐rider problems affecting governance, and how it produces price abnormalities analogous to those documented empirically. We also uncover how private information interdependence can be a key catalyst for the mechanism studied.
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APA
CETEMEN, D., CISTERNAS, G., KOLB, A., & VISWANATHAN, S. (2026). Leader‐Follower Dynamics in Shareholder Activism. The Journal of Finance, 81(3), 1377-1435. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70033
Vancouver
CETEMEN D, CISTERNAS G, KOLB A, VISWANATHAN S. Leader‐Follower Dynamics in Shareholder Activism. The Journal of Finance. 2026;81(3):1377-1435. doi:10.1111/jofi.70033
BibTeX
@article{CETEMEN2026,
author = {CETEMEN, DORUK and CISTERNAS, GONZALO and KOLB, AARON and VISWANATHAN, S.},
title = {Leader‐Follower Dynamics in Shareholder Activism},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2026},
volume = {81},
number = {3},
pages = {1377--1435},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.70033}
}
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