Deposit Inflows and Outflows in Failing Banks: The Role of Deposit Insurance
The Journal of Finance · 2026-04 · 81 (2) · 643-685
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70007 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 21.01.2026. Verfasst von CHRISTOPHER MARTIN und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 14-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 22 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Using unique, daily, account‐level data, we investigate deposit outflows and inflows in a distressed bank. We observe an outflow of uninsured depositors following bad regulatory news. Both regular and temporary deposit insurance reduce outflows. We provide important new evidence that, simultaneous with deposit outflows, deposit inflows are first order. Uninsured deposit outflows were largely offset with new insured deposit inflows as the bank approached failure, with the bank increasing term deposit rates. This phenomenon holds in a large sample of banks that faced regulatory action, suggesting that insured deposit inflows are an important mechanism that weakens depositor discipline.
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APA
MARTIN, C., PURI, M., & UFIER, A. (2026). Deposit Inflows and Outflows in Failing Banks: The Role of Deposit Insurance. The Journal of Finance, 81(2), 643-685. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70007
Vancouver
MARTIN C, PURI M, UFIER A. Deposit Inflows and Outflows in Failing Banks: The Role of Deposit Insurance. The Journal of Finance. 2026;81(2):643-685. doi:10.1111/jofi.70007
BibTeX
@article{MARTIN2026,
author = {MARTIN, CHRISTOPHER and PURI, MANJU and UFIER, ALEXANDER},
title = {Deposit Inflows and Outflows in Failing Banks: The Role of Deposit Insurance},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2026},
volume = {81},
number = {2},
pages = {643--685},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.70007}
}
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