Regulating Over‐the‐Counter Markets
The Journal of Finance · 2025-08 · 80 (4) · 1929-1962
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13461 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 30.05.2025. Verfasst von TOMY LEE und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Over‐the‐counter (OTC) trading thrives despite competition from exchanges. We let OTC dealers cream skim from exchanges in an otherwise standard Glosten and Milgrom framework. Restricting the dealer's ability to cream skim induces “cheap substitution”: some traders exit while others with larger gains from trade enter. Cheap substitution implies trading costs, trade volumes, and market shares are poor policy indicators. In a benchmark case, restricting the dealer raises welfare only if trading cost increases, volume falls, and OTC market share is high. By contrast, the restriction improves welfare when adverse selection risk is low. A simple procedure implements the optimal Pigouvian tax.
Zitieren
APA
LEE, T., & WANG, C. (2025). Regulating Over‐the‐Counter Markets. The Journal of Finance, 80(4), 1929-1962. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13461
Vancouver
LEE T, WANG C. Regulating Over‐the‐Counter Markets. The Journal of Finance. 2025;80(4):1929-1962. doi:10.1111/jofi.13461
BibTeX
@article{LEE2025,
author = {LEE, TOMY and WANG, CHAOJUN},
title = {Regulating Over‐the‐Counter Markets},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2025},
volume = {80},
number = {4},
pages = {1929--1962},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13461}
}
EUVIMED