Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral
The Journal of Finance · 2025-06 · 80 (3) · 1739-1768
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13445 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 09.04.2025. Verfasst von JASON RODERICK DONALDSON und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 13-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 83 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We develop a theory of secured debt, unsecured debt, and debt with anti‐dilution covenants. We assume that, as in practice, covenants convey the right to accelerate if violated, but the new secured debt retains its priority even if issued in violation of covenants. We find that such covenants are nonetheless useful: They provide state‐contingent financing flexibility, balancing over‐ and underinvestment incentives. The optimal debt structure is multilayered, combining secured and unsecured debt with and without covenants. Our results are consistent with observations about debt structure, covenant violations, and waivers. They speak to a policy debate about debt priority.
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APA
DONALDSON, J. R., GROMB, D., & PIACENTINO, G. (2025). Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral. The Journal of Finance, 80(3), 1739-1768. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13445
Vancouver
DONALDSON JR, GROMB D, PIACENTINO G. Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral. The Journal of Finance. 2025;80(3):1739-1768. doi:10.1111/jofi.13445
BibTeX
@article{DONALDSON2025,
author = {DONALDSON, JASON RODERICK and GROMB, DENIS and PIACENTINO, GIORGIA},
title = {Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2025},
volume = {80},
number = {3},
pages = {1739--1768},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13445}
}
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