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Crossref

Collusion in Brokered Markets

JOHN WILLIAM HATFIELD, SCOTT DUKE KOMINERS, RICHARD LOWERY

The Journal of Finance · 2025-06 · 80 (3) · 1417-1462

DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13432 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 18.03.2025. Verfasst von JOHN WILLIAM HATFIELD und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 64 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market pose a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to work with. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which each agent conditions working with other agents on those agents' posted prices. Prices can therefore be meaningfully higher than the competitive level (for a fixed discount factor), regardless of the number of agents. Thus, brokered markets can remain uncompetitive even with low concentration and easy entry.

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APA

HATFIELD, J. W., KOMINERS, S. D., & LOWERY, R. (2025). Collusion in Brokered Markets. The Journal of Finance, 80(3), 1417-1462. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13432

Vancouver

HATFIELD JW, KOMINERS SD, LOWERY R. Collusion in Brokered Markets. The Journal of Finance. 2025;80(3):1417-1462. doi:10.1111/jofi.13432

BibTeX
@article{HATFIELD2025,
  author = {HATFIELD, JOHN WILLIAM and KOMINERS, SCOTT DUKE and LOWERY, RICHARD},
  title = {Collusion in Brokered Markets},
  journal = {The Journal of Finance},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {80},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1417--1462},
  doi = {10.1111/jofi.13432}
}
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