Collusion in Brokered Markets
The Journal of Finance · 2025-06 · 80 (3) · 1417-1462
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13432 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 18.03.2025. Verfasst von JOHN WILLIAM HATFIELD und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 64 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market pose a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to work with. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which each agent conditions working with other agents on those agents' posted prices. Prices can therefore be meaningfully higher than the competitive level (for a fixed discount factor), regardless of the number of agents. Thus, brokered markets can remain uncompetitive even with low concentration and easy entry.
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APA
HATFIELD, J. W., KOMINERS, S. D., & LOWERY, R. (2025). Collusion in Brokered Markets. The Journal of Finance, 80(3), 1417-1462. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13432
Vancouver
HATFIELD JW, KOMINERS SD, LOWERY R. Collusion in Brokered Markets. The Journal of Finance. 2025;80(3):1417-1462. doi:10.1111/jofi.13432
BibTeX
@article{HATFIELD2025,
author = {HATFIELD, JOHN WILLIAM and KOMINERS, SCOTT DUKE and LOWERY, RICHARD},
title = {Collusion in Brokered Markets},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2025},
volume = {80},
number = {3},
pages = {1417--1462},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13432}
}
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