Regulatory Fragmentation
The Journal of Finance · 2025-04 · 80 (2) · 1081-1126
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13423 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 30.01.2025. Verfasst von JOSEPH KALMENOVITZ und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 62-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Regulatory fragmentation occurs when multiple federal agencies oversee a single issue. Using the full text of the Federal Register, the government's official daily publication, we provide the first systematic evidence on the extent and costs of regulatory fragmentation. Fragmentation increases the firm's costs while lowering its productivity, profitability, and growth. Moreover, it deters entry into an industry and increases the propensity of small firms to exit. These effects arise from redundancy and, more prominently, from inconsistencies between government agencies. Our results uncover a new source of regulatory burden, and we show that agency costs among regulators contribute to this burden.
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APA
KALMENOVITZ, J., LOWRY, M., & VOLKOVA, E. (2025). Regulatory Fragmentation. The Journal of Finance, 80(2), 1081-1126. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13423
Vancouver
KALMENOVITZ J, LOWRY M, VOLKOVA E. Regulatory Fragmentation. The Journal of Finance. 2025;80(2):1081-1126. doi:10.1111/jofi.13423
BibTeX
@article{KALMENOVITZ2025,
author = {KALMENOVITZ, JOSEPH and LOWRY, MICHELLE and VOLKOVA, EKATERINA},
title = {Regulatory Fragmentation},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2025},
volume = {80},
number = {2},
pages = {1081--1126},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13423}
}
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