Utility Tokens as a Commitment to Competition
The Journal of Finance · 2024-12 · 79 (6) · 4197-4246
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13389 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 10.10.2024. Verfasst von ITAY GOLDSTEIN und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 35-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We show that utility tokens can limit the rent‐seeking activities of two‐sided platforms with market power while preserving efficiency gains due to network effects. We model platforms where buyers and sellers can meet to exchange services. Tokens serve as the sole medium of exchange on a platform and can be traded in a secondary market. Tokenizing a platform commits a firm to give up monopolistic rents associated with the control of the platform, leading to long‐run competitive prices. We show how the threat of entrants can incentivize developers to tokenize and discuss cases where regulation is needed to enforce tokenization.
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APA
GOLDSTEIN, I., GUPTA, D., & SVERCHKOV, R. (2024). Utility Tokens as a Commitment to Competition. The Journal of Finance, 79(6), 4197-4246. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13389
Vancouver
GOLDSTEIN I, GUPTA D, SVERCHKOV R. Utility Tokens as a Commitment to Competition. The Journal of Finance. 2024;79(6):4197-4246. doi:10.1111/jofi.13389
BibTeX
@article{GOLDSTEIN2024,
author = {GOLDSTEIN, ITAY and GUPTA, DEEKSHA and SVERCHKOV, RUSLAN},
title = {Utility Tokens as a Commitment to Competition},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2024},
volume = {79},
number = {6},
pages = {4197--4246},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13389}
}
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