Bailout Stigma
The Journal of Finance · 2024-10 · 79 (5) · 2993-3039
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13386 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 23.08.2024. Verfasst von YEON‐KOO CHE und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We develop a model of bailout stigma in which accepting a bailout signals a firm's balance‐sheet weakness and reduces its funding prospects. To avoid stigma, high‐quality firms withdraw from subsequent financing after receiving bailouts or refuse bailouts altogether to send a favorable signal. The former leads to a short‐lived stimulation followed by a market freeze even worse than if there were no bailout. The latter revives the funding market, albeit with delay, to the level achievable without any stigma and implements a constrained optimal outcome. A menu of multiple bailout programs compounds bailout stigma and exacerbates the market freeze.
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APA
CHE, Y., CHOE, C., & RHEE, K. (2024). Bailout Stigma. The Journal of Finance, 79(5), 2993-3039. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13386
Vancouver
CHE Y, CHOE C, RHEE K. Bailout Stigma. The Journal of Finance. 2024;79(5):2993-3039. doi:10.1111/jofi.13386
BibTeX
@article{CHE2024,
author = {CHE, YEON‐KOO and CHOE, CHONGWOO and RHEE, KEEYOUNG},
title = {Bailout Stigma},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2024},
volume = {79},
number = {5},
pages = {2993--3039},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13386}
}
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