Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational, Governance, and Financial Engineering
The Journal of Finance · 2023-10 · 78 (5) · 2779-2836
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13265 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 29.07.2023. Verfasst von SEBASTIAN GRYGLEWICZ und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 15-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 78 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Private equity funds intermediate investment and affect portfolio firm performance by actively engaging in operational, governance, and financial engineering. We study this type of intermediation in a dynamic agency model in which an active intermediary raises funds from outside investors and invests in a firm run by an agent. Optimal contracting addresses moral hazard at the intermediary and firm levels. The intermediary's incentives to affect firm performance are strongest after poor performance, while the agent's incentives are strongest after good performance. We also show how financial engineering, that is, financial contracting with outside investors, interacts with operational and governance engineering.
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APA
GRYGLEWICZ, S., & MAYER, S. (2023). Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational, Governance, and Financial Engineering. The Journal of Finance, 78(5), 2779-2836. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13265
Vancouver
GRYGLEWICZ S, MAYER S. Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational, Governance, and Financial Engineering. The Journal of Finance. 2023;78(5):2779-2836. doi:10.1111/jofi.13265
BibTeX
@article{GRYGLEWICZ2023,
author = {GRYGLEWICZ, SEBASTIAN and MAYER, SIMON},
title = {Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational, Governance, and Financial Engineering},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2023},
volume = {78},
number = {5},
pages = {2779--2836},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13265}
}
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