Stealth Acquisitions and Product Market Competition
The Journal of Finance · 2023-10 · 78 (5) · 2837-2900
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13256 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 26.06.2023. Verfasst von JOHN D. KEPLER und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 36-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 60 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine whether and how firms structure their merger and acquisition deals to avoid antitrust scrutiny. There are approximately 40% more mergers and acquisitions (M&As) than expected just below deal value thresholds that trigger antitrust review. These “stealth acquisitions” tend to involve financial and governance contract terms that afford greater scope for negotiating and assigning lower deal values. We also show that the equity values, gross margins, and product prices of acquiring firms and their competitors increase following such acquisitions. Our results suggest that acquirers manipulate M&As to avoid antitrust scrutiny, thereby benefiting their own shareholders but potentially harming other corporate stakeholders.
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APA
KEPLER, J. D., NAIKER, V., & STEWART, C. R. (2023). Stealth Acquisitions and Product Market Competition. The Journal of Finance, 78(5), 2837-2900. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13256
Vancouver
KEPLER JD, NAIKER V, STEWART CR. Stealth Acquisitions and Product Market Competition. The Journal of Finance. 2023;78(5):2837-2900. doi:10.1111/jofi.13256
BibTeX
@article{KEPLER2023,
author = {KEPLER, JOHN D. and NAIKER, VIC and STEWART, CHRISTOPHER R.},
title = {Stealth Acquisitions and Product Market Competition},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2023},
volume = {78},
number = {5},
pages = {2837--2900},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13256}
}
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