Fiscal Progressivity and the Time Consistency of Monetary Policy
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · 28.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.70078 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, online erschienen am 28.07.2026. Verfasst von ANTOINE CAMOUS. Die Arbeit nennt 22 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper studies how progressive fiscal policy shapes monetary policy in a heterogeneous‐agent economy. Progressive labor taxation, though distortionary, can mitigate the inflation bias of monetary policy by redistributing income. I examine this commitment channel through the lens of political conflict. When agents vote on monetary and fiscal instruments, progressivity curbs inflation bias by creating distributional tensions: lower productivity agents support higher labor taxes to protect the value of money holdings and shift tax distortions toward higher productivity agents. Anticipating lower inflation, all agents ultimately prefer adopting a progressive fiscal system.
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APA
CAMOUS, A. (2026). Fiscal Progressivity and the Time Consistency of Monetary Policy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.70078
Vancouver
CAMOUS A. Fiscal Progressivity and the Time Consistency of Monetary Policy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 2026. doi:10.1111/jmcb.70078
BibTeX
@article{CAMOUS2026,
author = {CAMOUS, ANTOINE},
title = {Fiscal Progressivity and the Time Consistency of Monetary Policy},
journal = {Journal of Money, Credit and Banking},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/jmcb.70078}
}
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