Central Bank Digital Currency with Collateral‐Constrained Banks
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · 04.06.2026
DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.70063 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, online erschienen am 04.06.2026. Verfasst von HANFENG CHEN und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 21 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We analyze risks to bank intermediation following the introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) competing with commercial bank deposits as households' source of liquidity. We revisit the equivalence of payment systems result, introducing a collateral constraint on banks' borrowing from the central bank. Comparing equilibria with and without CBDC, we find that the central bank can ensure the same equilibrium allocation by offering loans to banks. However, to access loans, banks must hold collateral at the expense of extending credit to firms. While CBDC introduction has no real effects, it changes aggregate capital ownership and banks' business models.
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APA
CHEN, H., & FILIPPIN, M. E. (2026). Central Bank Digital Currency with Collateral‐Constrained Banks. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.70063
Vancouver
CHEN H, FILIPPIN ME. Central Bank Digital Currency with Collateral‐Constrained Banks. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 2026. doi:10.1111/jmcb.70063
BibTeX
@article{CHEN2026,
author = {CHEN, HANFENG and FILIPPIN, MARIA ELENA},
title = {Central Bank Digital Currency with Collateral‐Constrained Banks},
journal = {Journal of Money, Credit and Banking},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/jmcb.70063}
}
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