Outsourcing Bank Loan Screening: The Economics of Third‐Party Loan Guarantees
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · 2025-12 · 57 (8) · 2003-2042
DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.13219 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, online erschienen am 25.01.2025. Verfasst von CHENYU SHAN und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 29 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We provide the first theoretical and empirical study on third‐party loan guarantees, a prevalent financing channel worldwide for small borrowers. In our model, the project default probability is unobservable but can be probabilistically discovered with a screening cost. Guarantors, who are more cost‐effective in screening than banks, investigate borrowers and facilitate the financing of borrowers with insufficient collateral. Our data support this outsourcing theory: guarantor's risk measure predicts firms' default losses. Patterns of guarantee fees and loan rates are consistent with model predictions. Our findings illustrate how guarantors produce information and increase the efficiency of small business lending.
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APA
SHAN, C., TANG, D. Y., & WANG, W. (2025). Outsourcing Bank Loan Screening: The Economics of Third‐Party Loan Guarantees. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 57(8), 2003-2042. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13219
Vancouver
SHAN C, TANG DY, WANG W. Outsourcing Bank Loan Screening: The Economics of Third‐Party Loan Guarantees. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 2025;57(8):2003-2042. doi:10.1111/jmcb.13219
BibTeX
@article{SHAN2025,
author = {SHAN, CHENYU and TANG, DRAGON YONGJUN and WANG, WENYA},
title = {Outsourcing Bank Loan Screening: The Economics of Third‐Party Loan Guarantees},
journal = {Journal of Money, Credit and Banking},
year = {2025},
volume = {57},
number = {8},
pages = {2003--2042},
doi = {10.1111/jmcb.13219}
}
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