When subsidies build empires, not value
Journal of Financial Research · 28.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/jfir.70070 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Financial Research, online erschienen am 28.07.2026. Verfasst von Hanan Adam und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 37 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine how government subsidies alter corporate control activity in publicly traded U.S. firms. Using a panel from 2000–2022 that links Good Jobs First subsidy records with Bloomberg merger and acquisition (M&A) data, we find that subsidies increase firms’ likelihood of becoming acquirers while reducing their probability of becoming acquisition targets. Acquisitions of subsidized targets generate negative acquirer returns, indicating possible value destruction, consistent with free cash flow theory. Subsidized firms are also more likely to divest assets around M&A activity than non‐subsidized firms. Our results reveal how subsidies unintentionally alter recipient M&A incentives and dampened market discipline.
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APA
Adam, H., Pérez‐Amuedo, J. A., Hassan, M. K., & Houston, R. (2026). When subsidies build empires, not value. Journal of Financial Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.70070
Vancouver
Adam H, Pérez‐Amuedo JA, Hassan MK, Houston R. When subsidies build empires, not value. Journal of Financial Research. 2026. doi:10.1111/jfir.70070
BibTeX
@article{Adam2026,
author = {Adam, Hanan and Pérez‐Amuedo, José Antonio and Hassan, M. Kabir and Houston, Reza},
title = {When subsidies build empires, not value},
journal = {Journal of Financial Research},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/jfir.70070}
}
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