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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Distracted shareholders, information asymmetry, and capital markets: Evidence from the REIT industry

Collin Gilstrap, Alex Petkevich, Ozcan Sezer, Pavel Teterin

Journal of Financial Research · 05.07.2026

DOI: 10.1111/jfir.70065 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Financial Research, online erschienen am 05.07.2026. Verfasst von Collin Gilstrap und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 109 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We examine the impact of institutional monitoring on capital markets in an asset class with inherently low opportunity for agency risk. Despite the REIT industry's transparency, insufficient institutional oversight can produce adverse market outcomes. To capture shareholder distraction, we adapt the Kempf et al. (2017) measure to REITs, exploiting attention‐grabbing shocks to non‐REIT firms in institutional portfolios. We show that institutional investor distraction leads to higher levels of information asymmetry. In equity markets, we see more frequent stock price crashes and other negative tail events for firms lacking institutional investor attention. In corporate debt markets, these firms have higher credit spreads and lower credit ratings. Our results provide evidence that even a highly transparent sector with low agency risk is not immune to agency conflicts when institutional monitoring is scarce.

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APA

Gilstrap, C., Petkevich, A., Sezer, O., & Teterin, P. (2026). Distracted shareholders, information asymmetry, and capital markets: Evidence from the REIT industry. Journal of Financial Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/jfir.70065

Vancouver

Gilstrap C, Petkevich A, Sezer O, Teterin P. Distracted shareholders, information asymmetry, and capital markets: Evidence from the REIT industry. Journal of Financial Research. 2026. doi:10.1111/jfir.70065

BibTeX
@article{Gilstrap2026,
  author = {Gilstrap, Collin and Petkevich, Alex and Sezer, Ozcan and Teterin, Pavel},
  title = {Distracted shareholders, information asymmetry, and capital markets: Evidence from the REIT industry},
  journal = {Journal of Financial Research},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1111/jfir.70065}
}
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