Dual process models of clinical reasoning: The central role of knowledge in diagnostic expertise
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice · 2024-08 · 30 (5) · 788-796
DOI: 10.1111/jep.13998 ↗Kurz gefasst
Übersichtsarbeit in der Zeitschrift Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, online erschienen am 02.06.2024. Verfasst von Geoff Norman und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Clinical Reasoning, Clinical Competence, Diagnostic Errors. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 64-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 76 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Rationale
Research on diagnostic reasoning has been conducted for fifty years or more. There is growing consensus that there are two distinct processes involved in human diagnostic reasoning: System 1, a rapid retrieval of possible diagnostic hypotheses, largely automatic and based to a large part on experiential knowledge, and System 2, a slower, analytical, conscious application of formal knowledge to arrive at a diagnostic conclusion. However, within this broad framework, controversy and disagreement abound. In particular, many authors have suggested that the root cause of diagnostic errors is cognitive biases originating in System 1 and propose that educating learners about the types of cognitive biases and their impact on diagnosis would have a major influence on error reduction. Aims and Objectives In the present paper, we take issue with these claims.
Method
We reviewed the literature to examine the extent to which this theoretical model is supported by the evidence.
Results
We show that evidence derived from fundamental research in human cognition and studies in clinical medicine challenges the basic assumptions of this theory—that errors arise in System 1 processing as a consequence of cognitive biases, and are corrected by slow, deliberative analytical processing. We claim that, to the contrary, errors derive from both System 1 and System 2 reasoning, that they arise from lack of access to the appropriate knowledge, not from errors of processing, and that the two processes are not essential to the process of diagnostic reasoning.
Conclusions
The two processing modes are better understood as a consequence of the nature of the knowledge retrieved, not as independent processes.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.
- Centre for Training and Research in Health Sciences Education (CFRPS), Faculty of Medicine, University of Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France.
- Department of Emergency Medicine, Columbia University Irving Medical Center, New York, New York, USA.
- Department of Medicine, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.
Zitieren
APA
Norman, G., Pelaccia, T., Wyer, P., & Sherbino, J. (2024). Dual process models of clinical reasoning: The central role of knowledge in diagnostic expertise. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 30(5), 788-796. https://doi.org/10.1111/jep.13998
Vancouver
Norman G, Pelaccia T, Wyer P, Sherbino J. Dual process models of clinical reasoning: The central role of knowledge in diagnostic expertise. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice. 2024;30(5):788-796. doi:10.1111/jep.13998
BibTeX
@article{Norman2024,
author = {Norman, Geoff and Pelaccia, Thierry and Wyer, Peter and Sherbino, Jonathan},
title = {Dual process models of clinical reasoning: The central role of knowledge in diagnostic expertise},
journal = {Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice},
year = {2024},
volume = {30},
number = {5},
pages = {788--796},
doi = {10.1111/jep.13998}
}
EUVIMED