Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · 24.05.2026
DOI: 10.1111/jems.70035 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, online erschienen am 24.05.2026. Verfasst von Paolo Berta und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 47 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, we investigate the contracts offered by a large healthcare purchaser to health service providers. Contracts are based on the DRG principle that all hospitalizations in a diagnosis group are reimbursed at the same rate. This principle is relaxed in practice, as in several cases, the amount reimbursed within each DRG exhibits considerable variability. We build a theoretical model which explains this variability as the attempt of the health authority to ensure appropriate matching between hospitals and patients. We test the model using a very large and detailed administrative data set for the largest region in Italy. In line with our theoretical results, we show that the state funded purchaser offers providers a system of incentives such that, as required by optimality, that providers which treat more patients receive a higher average reimbursement per treatment, suggesting therefore that they treat on average more difficult patients and are compensated for doing so.
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APA
Berta, P., Fraja, G. D., & Verzillo, S. (2026). Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.70035
Vancouver
Berta P, Fraja GD, Verzillo S. Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 2026. doi:10.1111/jems.70035
BibTeX
@article{Berta2026,
author = {Berta, Paolo and Fraja, Gianni De and Verzillo, Stefano},
title = {Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence},
journal = {Journal of Economics & Management Strategy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/jems.70035}
}
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