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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Incentive and Signaling Effects of Bonus Payments: An Experiment in a Company

Marvin Deversi, Lisa Spantig

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · 23.03.2026

DOI: 10.1111/jems.70028 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, online erschienen am 23.03.2026. Verfasst von Marvin Deversi und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 60 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Elitenetzwerk Bayern.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Economists and management scholars have argued that the scope of incentives to increase cooperation in organizations is limited as their use may signal the prevalence of free‐riding among employees. This paper tests this hypothesis with an artefactual field experiment that assigns managers and employees from a large company to stylized roles within a controlled game. We exogenously vary whether managers are informed about prevailing cooperation levels among employees before they can set incentives to promote cooperation. In addition, employees matched to informed managers learn that the manager could base their incentive choice on cooperation levels. We find no evidence for the hypothesized signaling effect. Having an informed manager set the incentive does not change employees' beliefs about the cooperativeness of others. Incentives, hence, have strong positive effects on cooperative beliefs, irrespective of information. The absence of the signaling effect appears to reflect employees' perceptions of managerial intentions: incentives are interpreted not as signals of low cooperation, but as rewards for expected cooperation. A follow‐up survey experiment supports this mechanism, showing that a cooperative culture affects the interpretation of managerial actions.

Förderung

  • Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
  • Elitenetzwerk Bayern

Zitieren

APA

Deversi, M., & Spantig, L. (2026). Incentive and Signaling Effects of Bonus Payments: An Experiment in a Company. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.70028

Vancouver

Deversi M, Spantig L. Incentive and Signaling Effects of Bonus Payments: An Experiment in a Company. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 2026. doi:10.1111/jems.70028

BibTeX
@article{Deversi2026,
  author = {Deversi, Marvin and Spantig, Lisa},
  title = {Incentive and Signaling Effects of Bonus Payments: An Experiment in a Company},
  journal = {Journal of Economics & Management Strategy},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1111/jems.70028}
}
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