EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Incentivizing Physicians' Diagnostic Effort and Testing With Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

David Bardey, Philippe De Donder, Marie‐Louise Leroux

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · 2026-10 · 35 (4) · 748-767

DOI: 10.1111/jems.70024 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, online erschienen am 09.02.2026. Verfasst von David Bardey und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 38 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Agence Nationale de la Recherche.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We analyze a setting in which physicians, who differ in their degree of altruism, first exert diagnostic effort before deciding whether to administer a test to determine the most appropriate treatment. Diagnostic effort yields an imperfect private signal of the patient's type, whereas the test provides a more accurate assessment. Absent corrective transfers, physicians exert too little diagnostic effort and may rely excessively on testing. When altruism is either homogeneous or observable, the first‐best allocation can be decentralized through a payment scheme consisting of (i) a pay‐for‐performance (P4P) component, based on the proportion of correctly treated patients, to induce the optimal diagnostic effort and (ii) a fixed component to ensure both the optimal testing decision and physician participation. When altruism is heterogeneous and privately known to physicians, the two‐part tariff that decentralizes the first‐best is no longer incentive compatible. The optimal contract is pooling rather than separating, an instance of nonresponsiveness. Its uniform P4P component induces more altruistic physicians to exert higher diagnostic effort, while the fixed component must be conditioned on diagnostic test costs to promote optimal testing decisions.

Förderung

  • Agence Nationale de la Recherche

Zitieren

APA

Bardey, D., Donder, P. D., & Leroux, M. (2026). Incentivizing Physicians' Diagnostic Effort and Testing With Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 35(4), 748-767. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.70024

Vancouver

Bardey D, Donder PD, Leroux M. Incentivizing Physicians' Diagnostic Effort and Testing With Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 2026;35(4):748-767. doi:10.1111/jems.70024

BibTeX
@article{Bardey2026,
  author = {Bardey, David and Donder, Philippe De and Leroux, Marie‐Louise},
  title = {Incentivizing Physicians' Diagnostic Effort and Testing With Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection},
  journal = {Journal of Economics & Management Strategy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {35},
  number = {4},
  pages = {748--767},
  doi = {10.1111/jems.70024}
}
Kostenlos starten →