EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Expert Asymmetry: Evidence From Securities Litigation

Adam Callister, Andrew Granato, Belisa Pang

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies · 2026-09 · 23 (3) · 293-326

DOI: 10.1111/jels.70040 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, online erschienen am 19.06.2026. Verfasst von Adam Callister und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 101 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Modern litigation often involves two separate, extra‐legal features: (1) contingency fee arrangements with the plaintiff‐side attorney, and (2) a “battle of the experts” where the outcome of the case rests on conflicting expert witness testimony. We construct a model to illustrate that when these features occur simultaneously, in contexts where plaintiff‐side attorneys bear the cost of hiring experts upfront, defendants will spend systematically more than plaintiffs on hiring expert witnesses. Our model is motivated by hand‐collected data from a decade of securities class action litigation, where we show that experts polarize into almost entirely plaintiff‐side versus defense‐side experts, that defense‐side experts are more “prestigious” in terms of educational and academic affiliations, and that defense‐side experts are at least 36% more expensive in per‐hour terms. We argue that expert asymmetry could be closed through optimal contracting in certain individual claims, but it is likely a necessary feature of all class actions, such as toxic torts or consumer protection, in an “adversarial” litigation system. This defense‐side advantage therefore provides a newly identified rationale for “inquisitorial” litigation systems, including increased use of court‐appointed experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and state law analogues.

Zitieren

APA

Callister, A., Granato, A., & Pang, B. (2026). Expert Asymmetry: Evidence From Securities Litigation. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 23(3), 293-326. https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.70040

Vancouver

Callister A, Granato A, Pang B. Expert Asymmetry: Evidence From Securities Litigation. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. 2026;23(3):293-326. doi:10.1111/jels.70040

BibTeX
@article{Callister2026,
  author = {Callister, Adam and Granato, Andrew and Pang, Belisa},
  title = {Expert Asymmetry: Evidence From Securities Litigation},
  journal = {Journal of Empirical Legal Studies},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {23},
  number = {3},
  pages = {293--326},
  doi = {10.1111/jels.70040}
}
Kostenlos starten →