The quality admission and price decisions of production capacity on the third‐party platform for shared manufacturing
International Transactions in Operational Research · 2026-01 · 33 (1) · 529-566
DOI: 10.1111/itor.13517 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Transactions in Operational Research, online erschienen am 22.07.2024. Verfasst von Wenbo Li und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 9-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 47 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Many third‐party platforms for shared manufacturing (platforms) have developed rapidly in recent years. The quality admission and pricing of production capacity are crucial issues for these platforms. This paper focuses on the platform supply chain composed of a platform, multiple manufacturers with surplus production capacity (sharers), and multiple manufacturers with insufficient production capacity (renters). Considering the impact of the production capacity quality on the shared scale and rental demand of production capacity, this paper constructs a game model for the platform supply chain under different quality admission scenarios, investigates the quality admission and price decisions of production capacity on the platform, and analyses the impact of the quality admission on the sharers’ and renters’ profits. The results show that the platform sets the quality admission when the sharers’ production capacity scale is small and the platform regulatory cost is low. The platform always increases its service price but may reduce the rental price of production capacity under the quality admission scenario. When the sharers’ production capacity scale is large, the platform lowers the threshold of quality admission with the quality elasticity of production capacity increasing. In addition, when the quality elasticity of production capacity and platform regulatory cost are low, and the sharers’ production capacity scale is small, the quality admission of the platform realizes the win–win–win situation for the platform, renters, and sharers.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
Zitieren
APA
Li, W., Dan, B., Zhang, X., Lei, T., & Zhang, S. (2026). The quality admission and price decisions of production capacity on the third‐party platform for shared manufacturing. International Transactions in Operational Research, 33(1), 529-566. https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.13517
Vancouver
Li W, Dan B, Zhang X, Lei T, Zhang S. The quality admission and price decisions of production capacity on the third‐party platform for shared manufacturing. International Transactions in Operational Research. 2026;33(1):529-566. doi:10.1111/itor.13517
BibTeX
@article{Li2026,
author = {Li, Wenbo and Dan, Bin and Zhang, Xumei and Lei, Ting and Zhang, Shengming},
title = {The quality admission and price decisions of production capacity on the third‐party platform for shared manufacturing},
journal = {International Transactions in Operational Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {33},
number = {1},
pages = {529--566},
doi = {10.1111/itor.13517}
}
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