Recruiting without‐car drivers through multiple sources: the impact on a ride‐sharing platform's driver surplus and consumer surplus
International Transactions in Operational Research · 2025-05 · 32 (3) · 1677-1711
DOI: 10.1111/itor.13366 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Transactions in Operational Research, online erschienen am 10.09.2023. Verfasst von Qiang Lin und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 48 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Recently, ride‐sharing platforms have started to recruit not only with‐car drivers but also without‐car drivers. Without‐car drivers can directly rent cars from a ride‐sharing platform that operates its own fleets, which requires the platform to pay operating costs to manage the vehicles (self‐operated drivers) or rent cars from a car‐rental company that cooperates with the platform (rental drivers). This paper builds a stylized model to examine the impact of recruiting without‐car drivers on a platform's driver surplus, consumer surplus, and profit. We assume that a ride‐sharing platform first decides to recruit either with‐car drivers or both with‐ and without‐car drivers. Then, the platform sets a price charged to customers, a wage paid to drivers, and a rental fee charged to self‐operated drivers. Customers decide whether to order on a ride‐sharing platform based on the price and network externality term, while drivers choose to provide services according to the wage, rental fee charged by the platform or car‐rental company, and utilization rate. We find that when the platform recruits with‐car drivers (recruits with‐ and without‐car drivers), supply and demand are matched when the potential number of with‐car drivers is relatively small (large), while supply exceeds demand when the potential number of with‐car drivers is large (small). Moreover, when a ride‐sharing platform changes to recruit with‐ and without‐car drivers, the platform and customers always become better off, while drivers may not. Specifically, when the operating cost is relatively low or high (moderate), the drivers become better (worse) off.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Lin, Q., Zhai, J., Jin, K., & Lin, X. (2025). Recruiting without‐car drivers through multiple sources: the impact on a ride‐sharing platform's driver surplus and consumer surplus. International Transactions in Operational Research, 32(3), 1677-1711. https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.13366
Vancouver
Lin Q, Zhai J, Jin K, Lin X. Recruiting without‐car drivers through multiple sources: the impact on a ride‐sharing platform's driver surplus and consumer surplus. International Transactions in Operational Research. 2025;32(3):1677-1711. doi:10.1111/itor.13366
BibTeX
@article{Lin2025,
author = {Lin, Qiang and Zhai, Jiaxin and Jin, Kangning and Lin, Xiaogang},
title = {Recruiting without‐car drivers through multiple sources: the impact on a ride‐sharing platform's driver surplus and consumer surplus},
journal = {International Transactions in Operational Research},
year = {2025},
volume = {32},
number = {3},
pages = {1677--1711},
doi = {10.1111/itor.13366}
}
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