Common ownership with downstream firm's voluntary investment
International Journal of Economic Theory · 2026-12 · 22 (4) · 390-407
DOI: 10.1111/ijet.70026 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Economic Theory, online erschienen am 18.08.2026. Verfasst von Qing Hu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 31 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
It is well known that common ownership lessens competition, which tends to decrease consumer and total surpluses. This study challenges this well‐known result by introducing downstream firms' voluntary investment. We consider a vertical market with one upstream firm and two downstream firms, where the downstream firms engage in voluntary investment that can reduce the upstream firm's marginal cost. We show that common ownership may increase consumer and total surpluses if the investment is sufficiently efficient. While our main model focuses on homogeneous goods with quantity competition, our main results are robust under differentiated goods in both quantity and price competition.
Förderung
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
Zitieren
APA
Hu, Q., Masuyama, R., & Mizuno, T. (2026). Common ownership with downstream firm's voluntary investment. International Journal of Economic Theory, 22(4), 390-407. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.70026
Vancouver
Hu Q, Masuyama R, Mizuno T. Common ownership with downstream firm's voluntary investment. International Journal of Economic Theory. 2026;22(4):390-407. doi:10.1111/ijet.70026
BibTeX
@article{Hu2026,
author = {Hu, Qing and Masuyama, Ryo and Mizuno, Tomomichi},
title = {Common ownership with downstream firm's voluntary investment},
journal = {International Journal of Economic Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {22},
number = {4},
pages = {390--407},
doi = {10.1111/ijet.70026}
}
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