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Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability

Filippo Pavesi, Massimo Scotti

International Journal of Economic Theory · 2014

DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12037 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Economic Theory, 2014. Verfasst von Filippo Pavesi und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 29 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert who faces a conflict of interest with a decision maker is concerned about establishing a reputation for having accurate information. In this environment, an increase in reputation above a certain threshold always makes truthful revelation more difficult to achieve, since experts with greater reputation can more easily sway the beliefs of decision makers in a desired direction. Thus, higher levels of reputation exacerbate the incentives of biased experts to misreport their private information. Decision makers may therefore be better off consulting less reputable experts when conflicts are more pronounced.

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APA

Pavesi, F., & Scotti, M. (2014). Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability. International Journal of Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12037

Vancouver

Pavesi F, Scotti M. Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability. International Journal of Economic Theory. 2014. doi:10.1111/ijet.12037

BibTeX
@article{Pavesi2014,
  author = {Pavesi, Filippo and Scotti, Massimo},
  title = {Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability},
  journal = {International Journal of Economic Theory},
  year = {2014},
  doi = {10.1111/ijet.12037}
}
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