Coordination of tax policies toward inward foreign direct investment
International Journal of Economic Theory · 2014
DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12029 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Economic Theory, 2014. Verfasst von Amy Jocelyn Glass und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 21 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) between host countries and the implications of tax policy coordination between them. By reducing its tax on multinational production, a host country can attract additional FDI, some of which is diverted from other host countries. The shift in FDI causes host wages to rise while wages elsewhere fall. The host country with the lower natural attractiveness for FDI (absent intervention) adopts a smaller tax on multinational production. Coordination between hosts eliminates the FDI diversion effect and leads them to impose a harmonized FDI tax that is larger than their non‐cooperative tax levels.
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APA
Glass, A. J., & Saggi, K. (2014). Coordination of tax policies toward inward foreign direct investment. International Journal of Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12029
Vancouver
Glass AJ, Saggi K. Coordination of tax policies toward inward foreign direct investment. International Journal of Economic Theory. 2014. doi:10.1111/ijet.12029
BibTeX
@article{Glass2014,
author = {Glass, Amy Jocelyn and Saggi, Kamal},
title = {Coordination of tax policies toward inward foreign direct investment},
journal = {International Journal of Economic Theory},
year = {2014},
doi = {10.1111/ijet.12029}
}
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