EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Does Audit Oversight Matter for Management Going‐Concern Disclosures? Evidence From Japan

Hyonok Kim, Hironori Fukukawa, James Routledge

International Journal of Auditing · 28.06.2026

DOI: 10.1111/ijau.70043 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Auditing, online erschienen am 28.06.2026. Verfasst von Hyonok Kim und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 74 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This study examines whether managers continue to disclose going‐concern risks when audit oversight is reduced. While regulators have generally responded to the concerns regarding going‐concern risk disclosures by strengthening audit oversight, Japan's 2009 reform provides a unique setting in which oversight was relaxed. Using data on financially distressed firms, we find that both the likelihood and extent of going‐concern disclosures were sustained after the reform. The results indicate that relaxing audit verification did not diminish disclosure and that managerial incentives play an important role in going‐concern reporting.

Zitieren

APA

Kim, H., Fukukawa, H., & Routledge, J. (2026). Does Audit Oversight Matter for Management Going‐Concern Disclosures? Evidence From Japan. International Journal of Auditing. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.70043

Vancouver

Kim H, Fukukawa H, Routledge J. Does Audit Oversight Matter for Management Going‐Concern Disclosures? Evidence From Japan. International Journal of Auditing. 2026. doi:10.1111/ijau.70043

BibTeX
@article{Kim2026,
  author = {Kim, Hyonok and Fukukawa, Hironori and Routledge, James},
  title = {Does Audit Oversight Matter for Management Going‐Concern Disclosures? Evidence From Japan},
  journal = {International Journal of Auditing},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1111/ijau.70043}
}
Kostenlos starten →