Cross‐Prudence and Optimal Prevention
International Economic Review · 24.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/iere.70092 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Economic Review, online erschienen am 24.07.2026. Verfasst von Jingyuan Li und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 65 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, we study optimal prevention in the presence of a correlated nonfinancial background risk. Under positive correlation, cross‐prudence in the nonfinancial attribute reduces optimal prevention. We establish this result in the most direct extension of the standard prevention problem with binary marginal distributions and show that it extends to richer settings. Our analysis highlights a broader implication: in economically relevant cases with loss probabilities below one‐half and positive correlation, cross‐prudence emerges as an additional force that discourages prevention. As a result, optimal prevention can fall below the expected‐cost minimizing level, even when agents are risk‐averse.
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APA
Li, J., Peter, R., & Zhou, L. (2026). Cross‐Prudence and Optimal Prevention. International Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70092
Vancouver
Li J, Peter R, Zhou L. Cross‐Prudence and Optimal Prevention. International Economic Review. 2026. doi:10.1111/iere.70092
BibTeX
@article{Li2026,
author = {Li, Jingyuan and Peter, Richard and Zhou, Lin},
title = {Cross‐Prudence and Optimal Prevention},
journal = {International Economic Review},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/iere.70092}
}
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