Political Accountability During Crises: Evidence From 40 Years of Financial Policies
International Economic Review · 27.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/iere.70091 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Economic Review, online erschienen am 27.07.2026. Verfasst von Orkun Saka und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 100 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Economic and Social Research Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We show that politicians facing a binding term limit are more likely to engage in financial deliberalization than those facing reelection, but only in the wake of a financial crisis. In particular, they implement policies that tend to favor incumbent financial institutions over the general population, such as increasing barriers to entry in the banking sector. We propose a conceptual framework and several mechanisms to rationalize this behavior and show that revolving doors between the government and the financial sector play a key role in encouraging bank‐friendly policies after crises.
Förderung
- Economic and Social Research Council
Zitieren
APA
Saka, O., Ji, Y., & Minaudier, C. (2026). Political Accountability During Crises: Evidence From 40 Years of Financial Policies. International Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70091
Vancouver
Saka O, Ji Y, Minaudier C. Political Accountability During Crises: Evidence From 40 Years of Financial Policies. International Economic Review. 2026. doi:10.1111/iere.70091
BibTeX
@article{Saka2026,
author = {Saka, Orkun and Ji, Yuemei and Minaudier, Clement},
title = {Political Accountability During Crises: Evidence From 40 Years of Financial Policies},
journal = {International Economic Review},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/iere.70091}
}
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