Signaling Vision: Knowing When to Quit
International Economic Review · 2026-08 · 67 (3) · 997-1013
DOI: 10.1111/iere.70066 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Economic Review, online erschienen am 10.03.2026. Verfasst von Junichiro Ishida und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 22 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study a signaling game where agents signal their type by choosing when to quit pursuing an uncertain project. High types observe news about project quality and quit when bad news arrives. Low types who do not observe any news may mimic high types by quitting continuously over a phase of time. The reputation dynamics may exhibit nonmonotonicity with respect to quitting time. Our analysis offers a unifying explanation for how and when both early and late quitting can enhance reputation and suggests novel welfare and policy implications.
Förderung
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
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APA
Ishida, J., & Suen, W. (2026). Signaling Vision: Knowing When to Quit. International Economic Review, 67(3), 997-1013. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70066
Vancouver
Ishida J, Suen W. Signaling Vision: Knowing When to Quit. International Economic Review. 2026;67(3):997-1013. doi:10.1111/iere.70066
BibTeX
@article{Ishida2026,
author = {Ishida, Junichiro and Suen, Wing},
title = {Signaling Vision: Knowing When to Quit},
journal = {International Economic Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {67},
number = {3},
pages = {997--1013},
doi = {10.1111/iere.70066}
}
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