Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements
International Economic Review · 2026-05 · 67 (2) · 433-449
DOI: 10.1111/iere.70061 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Economic Review, online erschienen am 27.02.2026. Verfasst von Gustavo de Souza und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 43 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In the United States, workers must satisfy two requirements to receive unemployment insurance (UI): a tenure requirement of a minimum work spell and a monetary requirement of past minimum earnings. Using discontinuity of UI rules at state borders, we find that both requirements reduce unemployment and that the monetary requirement decreases the number of employers and the share of part‐time workers, while the tenure requirement has the opposite effect. We develop a heterogeneous agents model with history‐dependent UI benefits to explain these results and quantify an optimal utilitarian UI design. The optimal policy has a high monetary and a short tenure requirement.
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APA
Souza, G. D., & Luduvice, A. V. D. (2026). Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements. International Economic Review, 67(2), 433-449. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70061
Vancouver
Souza GD, Luduvice AVD. Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements. International Economic Review. 2026;67(2):433-449. doi:10.1111/iere.70061
BibTeX
@article{Souza2026,
author = {Souza, Gustavo de and Luduvice, André Victor D.},
title = {Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements},
journal = {International Economic Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {67},
number = {2},
pages = {433--449},
doi = {10.1111/iere.70061}
}
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