KILLER ACQUISITIONS AND BEYOND: POLICY EFFECTS ON INNOVATION STRATEGIES
International Economic Review · 2024-05 · 65 (2) · 591-622
DOI: 10.1111/iere.12689 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Economic Review, online erschienen am 20.02.2024. Verfasst von Igor Letina und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 32-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 57 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start‐ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that, in spite of countervailing incentives on incumbents and entrants, prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative overall innovation effect. We provide conditions determining the size of the effect and conditions under which it is zero. We further analyze the effects of less restrictive policies, including merger remedies and the tax treatment of acquisitions and initial public offerings. Such interventions tend to prevent acquisitions only if the entrant has sufficiently high stand‐alone profits.
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APA
Letina, I., Schmutzler, A., & Seibel, R. (2024). KILLER ACQUISITIONS AND BEYOND: POLICY EFFECTS ON INNOVATION STRATEGIES. International Economic Review, 65(2), 591-622. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12689
Vancouver
Letina I, Schmutzler A, Seibel R. KILLER ACQUISITIONS AND BEYOND: POLICY EFFECTS ON INNOVATION STRATEGIES. International Economic Review. 2024;65(2):591-622. doi:10.1111/iere.12689
BibTeX
@article{Letina2024,
author = {Letina, Igor and Schmutzler, Armin and Seibel, Regina},
title = {KILLER ACQUISITIONS AND BEYOND: POLICY EFFECTS ON INNOVATION STRATEGIES},
journal = {International Economic Review},
year = {2024},
volume = {65},
number = {2},
pages = {591--622},
doi = {10.1111/iere.12689}
}
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