The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Corruption: A Non-linear Hypothesis
German Economic Review · 01.02.2019 · 20 (1) · 105-128
DOI: 10.1111/geer.12164 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift German Economic Review, online erschienen am 30.11.2019. Verfasst von Maria Rosaria Alfano und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 20-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 59 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study advances the literature on the effect of decentralization on corruption by proposing a theoretical motivation for the hypothesis that the corruptionminimizing decentralization arrangement prescribes intermediate decentralization degrees: a ‘middle’ decision-making power of local governors may mitigate the tradeoff between the rent-seeking incentive for local politicians and the effectiveness of their voters’ monitoring. The estimation of a non-linear empirical model strongly confirms that a decentralization degree between 15% and 21% minimizes corruption even through different estimation procedures, introduction of control variables and the use of internal and external IV and of alternative decentralization and corruption measurements.
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APA
Alfano, M. R., Baraldi, A. L., & Cantabene, C. (2019). The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Corruption: A Non-linear Hypothesis. German Economic Review, 20(1), 105-128. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12164
Vancouver
Alfano MR, Baraldi AL, Cantabene C. The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Corruption: A Non-linear Hypothesis. German Economic Review. 2019;20(1):105-128. doi:10.1111/geer.12164
BibTeX
@article{Alfano2019,
author = {Alfano, Maria Rosaria and Baraldi, Anna Laura and Cantabene, Claudia},
title = {The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Corruption: A Non-linear Hypothesis},
journal = {German Economic Review},
year = {2019},
volume = {20},
number = {1},
pages = {105--128},
doi = {10.1111/geer.12164}
}
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