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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Lender‐Affiliated Analysts and Syndicated Loans

Yongqiang Chu, Tao Ma, Cong (Roman) Wang

Financial Management · 09.04.2026

DOI: 10.1111/fima.70042 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Financial Management, online erschienen am 09.04.2026. Verfasst von Yongqiang Chu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 50 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Loans to borrowers covered by affiliated analysts have lower spreads. This effect is driven mostly by affiliated analysts sharing information with, rather than demanding information from, lending arms. Exploiting plausibly exogenous changes in brokerage affiliations, we find that the results are likely to be causal. Affiliated analysts' private information and industry knowledge contribute to these spread reductions. Lenders are less likely to request projected financial information and to require financial information more frequently than quarterly via affirmative covenants, suggesting that information from affiliated analysts substitutes for costly borrower disclosure. Affiliated analyst coverage is associated with more financial covenants, consistent with affiliated analysts facilitating effective post‐origination monitoring. These results highlight a novel role that analysts play in the debt market.

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APA

Chu, Y., Ma, T., & Wang, C. R. (2026). Lender‐Affiliated Analysts and Syndicated Loans. Financial Management. https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.70042

Vancouver

Chu Y, Ma T, Wang CR. Lender‐Affiliated Analysts and Syndicated Loans. Financial Management. 2026. doi:10.1111/fima.70042

BibTeX
@article{Chu2026,
  author = {Chu, Yongqiang and Ma, Tao and Wang, Cong (Roman)},
  title = {Lender‐Affiliated Analysts and Syndicated Loans},
  journal = {Financial Management},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1111/fima.70042}
}
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