Keeping Up With the Joneses: Spillover Effect of M&A Activity to Compensation
European Financial Management · 2026-11 · 32 (5) · 1697-1729
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.70072 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Financial Management, online erschienen am 08.05.2026. Verfasst von Patty Bick und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 41 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We identify a spillover effect from Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activity to CEO compensation. Previous research shows that post‐merger, acquiring CEOs receive higher pay with reduced sensitivity to negative performance. We demonstrate that CEOs who don't engage in M&A, but have compensation peers who do, also experience increased pay and decreased pay‐performance sensitivity for negative returns. Additionally, M&A activity significantly influences compensation peer group composition. Our results reveal the effect of peer M&A on compensation results from both labour market pressures and self‐dealing, contributing to explanations for the substantial rise in CEO compensation in recent decades.
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APA
Bick, P., & Flugum, R. (2026). Keeping Up With the Joneses: Spillover Effect of M&A Activity to Compensation. European Financial Management, 32(5), 1697-1729. https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.70072
Vancouver
Bick P, Flugum R. Keeping Up With the Joneses: Spillover Effect of M&A Activity to Compensation. European Financial Management. 2026;32(5):1697-1729. doi:10.1111/eufm.70072
BibTeX
@article{Bick2026,
author = {Bick, Patty and Flugum, Ryan},
title = {Keeping Up With the Joneses: Spillover Effect of M&A Activity to Compensation},
journal = {European Financial Management},
year = {2026},
volume = {32},
number = {5},
pages = {1697--1729},
doi = {10.1111/eufm.70072}
}
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