Restraining Overconfident CEOs Through Credit Ratings
European Financial Management · 2025-11 · 31 (5) · 1771-1792
DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12557 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Financial Management, online erschienen am 11.05.2025. Verfasst von Shee‐Yee Khoo und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 71 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Overconfident CEOs significantly reduce their acquisition activity when facing a higher risk of a credit rating downgrade, possibly because credit ratings impact their ability to access external financing. Investment‐grade firms managed by overconfident CEOs that are placed on a negative rating outlook reduce their acquisitiveness by approximately 16 percentage points. Our findings offer a novel perspective on the role of credit rating agencies as an external control mechanism, constraining overconfident managers from pursuing value‐destroying acquisitions. Our findings survive a battery of robustness checks, including endogeneity, controlling for internal control mechanisms and market reaction tests.
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APA
Khoo, S., Verousis, T., Vu, H., & Klusak, P. (2025). Restraining Overconfident CEOs Through Credit Ratings. European Financial Management, 31(5), 1771-1792. https://doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12557
Vancouver
Khoo S, Verousis T, Vu H, Klusak P. Restraining Overconfident CEOs Through Credit Ratings. European Financial Management. 2025;31(5):1771-1792. doi:10.1111/eufm.12557
BibTeX
@article{Khoo2025,
author = {Khoo, Shee‐Yee and Verousis, Thanos and Vu, Huong and Klusak, Patrycja},
title = {Restraining Overconfident CEOs Through Credit Ratings},
journal = {European Financial Management},
year = {2025},
volume = {31},
number = {5},
pages = {1771--1792},
doi = {10.1111/eufm.12557}
}
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