Sensation and Perception in Merleau‐Ponty
European Journal of Philosophy · 16.11.2026
DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70132 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 16.11.2026. Verfasst von Peter Antich. Die Arbeit nennt 20 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The long “Introduction” to the Phenomenology of Perception begins with a rejection of the classical notion of sensation as “the most confused notion there is.” And yet Merleau‐Ponty continues to speak of sensation throughout the Phenomenology , and indeed, throughout his corpus. This poses an obvious interpretive puzzle, and one which has not received a focal treatment in the literature. In this paper, I consider three questions: 1) What view of sensing does Merleau‐Ponty reject in the Introduction? 2) On the other hand, what view of sensation does he wish to maintain? 3) How exactly does sensation, on his view, differ from perception? By working through these questions, I propose an interpretation on which sensation is conceived as a kind of perception, and one which is expressively basic (in a sense to be explained), such that in being given, it discloses other phenomena that are not properly given.
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APA
Antich, P. (2026). Sensation and Perception in Merleau‐Ponty. European Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70132
Vancouver
Antich P. Sensation and Perception in Merleau‐Ponty. European Journal of Philosophy. 2026. doi:10.1111/ejop.70132
BibTeX
@article{Antich2026,
author = {Antich, Peter},
title = {Sensation and Perception in Merleau‐Ponty},
journal = {European Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/ejop.70132}
}
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