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In Defence of Oblique Intention

Vladimir Krstić

European Journal of Philosophy · 08.07.2026

DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70113 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 08.07.2026. Verfasst von Vladimir Krstić. Die Arbeit nennt 79 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Recent work on lying has revived an old action‐theoretic category: oblique, or indirect, intention. I argue that some liars intend deception obliquely. Sneddon objects that this category is drastic and unjustified: it counts all foreseen side‐effects as intended. My response is that oblique intention is not mere foresight. It applies only where an agent foresees an unwanted effect, could avoid it by abandoning or altering the relevant course of action, and nevertheless accepts that effect as a required cost of pursuing her end. This distinguishes obliquely intended effects from mere side‐effects and non‐intentionally produced effects, where the agent submits to an unavoidable consequence without aiming at it in any sense. This distinction clarifies contested cases of lying. Some liars do not aim directly at deception, but neither do they merely allow it nor non‐intentionally deceive; they obliquely intend to deceive.

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APA

Krstić, V. (2026). In Defence of Oblique Intention. European Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70113

Vancouver

Krstić V. In Defence of Oblique Intention. European Journal of Philosophy. 2026. doi:10.1111/ejop.70113

BibTeX
@article{Krsti2026,
  author = {Krstić, Vladimir},
  title = {In Defence of Oblique Intention},
  journal = {European Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1111/ejop.70113}
}
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