Speculative Unity in Hegel's Restrictive Identity Claim
European Journal of Philosophy · 03.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/ejop.70110 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 03.07.2026. Verfasst von Ana Vieyra. Die Arbeit nennt 41 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Hegel identifies thought with the ‘in itself’ of things. It is common to read the statement as an unrestricted claim regarding Hegel's metaphysical view of reality. I argue it should be read as the expression of what speculative truth achieves. When speculative truth is achieved, that which thinking thinks when thinking the true nature of the object is one and the same as that which is truly thinkable in it. Although seemingly uncontroversial, I argue that an overlooked implication of Identity as the achievement of speculative truth is a restrictive view of the adequate objects for speculative cognition: it restricts speculative cognition to things expressing the internally purposive form of the self. I argue this solves a difficulty ‘apperceptive’ interpretations of the Logic face, namely the inability to meet an inflationary standard for metaphysical truth.
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APA
Vieyra, A. (2026). Speculative Unity in Hegel's Restrictive Identity Claim. European Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.70110
Vancouver
Vieyra A. Speculative Unity in Hegel's Restrictive Identity Claim. European Journal of Philosophy. 2026. doi:10.1111/ejop.70110
BibTeX
@article{Vieyra2026,
author = {Vieyra, Ana},
title = {Speculative Unity in Hegel's Restrictive Identity Claim},
journal = {European Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/ejop.70110}
}
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