Conservatism and justified attachment
European Journal of Philosophy · 2024-12 · 32 (4) · 1304-1316
DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12966 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 17.05.2024. Verfasst von Travis Quigley. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 11 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Value conservatism is the thesis that there is a distinctive reason to preserve valuable things even when a (somewhat) more valuable thing might be created by their destruction. I offer an account that improves on the current literature in response to Cohen's “Rescuing Conservatism.” In short, we become psychologically attached to valuable things that make up part of our lives; the same holds true, interestingly, with things of relatively neutral value. Severing attachments is painful. This yields a reason to favor an object that someone is attached to over an object that no one is attached to. But an analysis is only part of a theory of conservatism: we also need to know whether such conservatism is justified. I argue that Cohen's idea of “accepting the given” can be read to yield such a justification: it is valuable to maintain some moderate disposition to accept what one already has. This attachment‐based account of conservatism displays a number of attractive theoretical features, including accounting for the impulse to restore past valuables and providing a framework for judging conservatism excessive.
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APA
Quigley, T. (2024). Conservatism and justified attachment. European Journal of Philosophy, 32(4), 1304-1316. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12966
Vancouver
Quigley T. Conservatism and justified attachment. European Journal of Philosophy. 2024;32(4):1304-1316. doi:10.1111/ejop.12966
BibTeX
@article{Quigley2024,
author = {Quigley, Travis},
title = {Conservatism and justified attachment},
journal = {European Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2024},
volume = {32},
number = {4},
pages = {1304--1316},
doi = {10.1111/ejop.12966}
}
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