A priori intuition and transcendental necessity in Kant's idealism
European Journal of Philosophy · 2021-12 · 29 (4) · 827-845
DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12607 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift European Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 07.10.2020. Verfasst von Markus Kohl. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 30 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
I examine how Kant argues for the transcendental ideality of space. I defend a reading on which Kant accepts the ideality of space because it explains our (actual) knowledge that mathematical judgments are necessarily true. I argue that this reading is preferable over the alternative suggestion that Kant can infer the ideality of space directly from the fact that we have an a priori intuition of space. Moreover, I argue that the reading I propose does not commit Kant to incoherent modal views. If we carefully distinguish between different senses of modality, the fact that our spatial form of intuition is (in some sense) contingent does not undermine the claim that this form can explain how our mathematical judgments are (in some sense) necessary.
Zitieren
APA
Kohl, M. (2021). A priori intuition and transcendental necessity in Kant's idealism. European Journal of Philosophy, 29(4), 827-845. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12607
Vancouver
Kohl M. A priori intuition and transcendental necessity in Kant's idealism. European Journal of Philosophy. 2021;29(4):827-845. doi:10.1111/ejop.12607
BibTeX
@article{Kohl2021,
author = {Kohl, Markus},
title = {A priori intuition and transcendental necessity in Kant's idealism},
journal = {European Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2021},
volume = {29},
number = {4},
pages = {827--845},
doi = {10.1111/ejop.12607}
}
EUVIMED