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SYMMETRIC SCORING RULES AND A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BORDA COUNT

Jac C. Heckelman, Robi Ragan

Economic Inquiry · 2021-01 · 59 (1) · 287-299

DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12929 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economic Inquiry, online erschienen am 23.07.2020. Verfasst von Jac C. Heckelman und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 19 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Young developed a classic axiomatization of the Borda rule almost 50 years ago. He proved it is the only voting rule satisfying the normative properties of decisiveness, neutrality, reinforcement, faithfulness and cancellation. Often overlooked is that the uniqueness of Borda applies only to variable populations. We present a different set of properties which only Borda satisfies when both the set of voters and the set of alternatives can vary. It is also shown Borda is the only scoring rule which will satisfy all of the new properties when the number of voters stays fixed. ( JEL D71, D02, H00)

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APA

Heckelman, J. C., & Ragan, R. (2021). SYMMETRIC SCORING RULES AND A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BORDA COUNT. Economic Inquiry, 59(1), 287-299. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12929

Vancouver

Heckelman JC, Ragan R. SYMMETRIC SCORING RULES AND A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BORDA COUNT. Economic Inquiry. 2021;59(1):287-299. doi:10.1111/ecin.12929

BibTeX
@article{Heckelman2021,
  author = {Heckelman, Jac C. and Ragan, Robi},
  title = {SYMMETRIC SCORING RULES AND A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BORDA COUNT},
  journal = {Economic Inquiry},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {59},
  number = {1},
  pages = {287--299},
  doi = {10.1111/ecin.12929}
}
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