EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Collective PES Contracts Can Motivate Institutional Creation to Conserve Forests: Experimental Evidence

Tara Grillos, Nathan J. Cook, Krister P. Andersson

Conservation Letters · 2024-11 · 17 (6)

DOI: 10.1111/conl.13066 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Conservation Letters, online erschienen am 08.11.2024. Verfasst von Tara Grillos und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Science Foundation.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Incentives are a widely used tool for addressing deforestation and are often implemented as collective contracts. Local institutions are crucial to the solution of collective action problems associated with forest conservation, but we still have little knowledge of how to encourage institutional creation through policy. Since collective contracts do not eliminate freeriding incentives, we argue that their success hinges on their ability to stimulate the creation of institutions for collective action. To test these ideas, we analyze data from an incentivized lab‐in‐the‐field experimental collective action game played with natural resource users in four developing countries. The experiment simulates management of a common forest, and groups were randomly assigned to a conservation incentive payment condition. We observe how much group members attempt to coordinate on the creation of institutional rules and find experimental evidence that an external incentive program can stimulate the endogenous creation of informal institutions.

Förderung

  • National Science Foundation

Zitieren

APA

Grillos, T., Cook, N. J., & Andersson, K. P. (2024). Collective PES Contracts Can Motivate Institutional Creation to Conserve Forests: Experimental Evidence. Conservation Letters, 17(6). https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.13066

Vancouver

Grillos T, Cook NJ, Andersson KP. Collective PES Contracts Can Motivate Institutional Creation to Conserve Forests: Experimental Evidence. Conservation Letters. 2024;17(6). doi:10.1111/conl.13066

BibTeX
@article{Grillos2024,
  author = {Grillos, Tara and Cook, Nathan J. and Andersson, Krister P.},
  title = {Collective PES Contracts Can Motivate Institutional Creation to Conserve Forests: Experimental Evidence},
  journal = {Conservation Letters},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {17},
  number = {6},
  doi = {10.1111/conl.13066}
}
Kostenlos starten →