The effects of minimum wage regulation in inter‐regional oligopoly competition
Contemporary Economic Policy · 13.08.2026
DOI: 10.1111/coep.70050 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Contemporary Economic Policy, online erschienen am 13.08.2026. Verfasst von Noriaki Matsushima und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 59 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Japan Science and Technology Agency.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine how minimum wage regulation affects firm profit when labor‐market power interacts with product‐market competition. A binding wage floor reduces the regulated firm's marginal labor cost, inducing it to expand production. This expansion can induce rivals to contract production when relevant strategic variables are strategic substitutes. The mechanism can raise the regulated firm's profit as well as total employment and consumer surplus. We characterize the conditions for profit enhancement and show how labor‐market linkages alter strategic interaction. For instance, in a differentiated‐product Bertrand duopoly with a shared duopsony component, prices can become strategic substitutes, yielding a related profit‐enhancing mechanism.
Förderung
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
- Japan Science and Technology Agency
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APA
Matsushima, N., Nishikawa, K., & Qiu, J. (2026). The effects of minimum wage regulation in inter‐regional oligopoly competition. Contemporary Economic Policy. https://doi.org/10.1111/coep.70050
Vancouver
Matsushima N, Nishikawa K, Qiu J. The effects of minimum wage regulation in inter‐regional oligopoly competition. Contemporary Economic Policy. 2026. doi:10.1111/coep.70050
BibTeX
@article{Matsushima2026,
author = {Matsushima, Noriaki and Nishikawa, Kazuki and Qiu, Jiaying},
title = {The effects of minimum wage regulation in inter‐regional oligopoly competition},
journal = {Contemporary Economic Policy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/coep.70050}
}
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